Abstract
Introduction
We propose that two categories of software reliability measurements and predictions be used in combination to assist in assuring the safety of the software in safety critical systems like the NASA Space Shuttle Primaly Avionics Software System. The two categories are: 1) measurements and predictions that are associated with residual sofhare faults and failures, and 2) measurements and predictions that are associated with the ability of the software to survive a mission without experiencing a serious failure. In the first category are: remaining failures, total failures, fraction of remaining failures, and test time required to attain a given number or fraction of remaining failures. In the second category are: time to next failure and test time required to attain a given time to next failure. In addition, we define the risk associated with not attaining the required remaining failures and time to next failure. Lastly, we derive a quantity h m the*tion of remainingfailures that we call program quality. The benefits of predicting these quantities are: 1) they provide d d e n c e that the software has achieved safety goals, and 2) they provide a means of rationalizing how long to test a piece of software. Having predictions of the extent that the software is not fault gee (remaining failures) and its ability to Sunrive a mission (time to next failure) are meaningful for assessing the risk of deploying safety critical software. In addition, with this type of mformation a program mauager cau determine whether more testing is warranted, or whether the software is Suffciently tested to allow its release or unrestricted use. These predictions, in combination with other methods of assurance, such as inspections, defect prevention, project control boards, process assessment, and fault tracking, provide a quantitative basis for achieving safety and reliability objectives PIL941. Although remaining failures has been discussed in general as a type of software reliability prediction w S S 7 ] , and various stopping rules for testing have been proposed, based on the econOmics of testing p a 9 4 1 and a testability criterion [VOA95] , our approach is novel because we integrate safety criteria, risk analysis, and a stopping rule for testing. Furthermore, we use reliability measurements and predictions to assess whether safety goals are likely to be achieved. Thus we advocate using safety analysis and reliability analysis synergistically in a mutually supportive way rather than treat these fields as disjoint and unrelated.
Criteria for Safety
If we define our safety goal as the reduction of failures that would cause loss of life, loss of mission, or abort of mission to an acceptable level of risk &EV86], then for software to be ready to deploy, &er having been tested for time G, we must satisfj the following criteria:
where R, is a specified critical value , and 2) predicted time to next failure TAG)>&, where t,,, is mission duration.
(2)
For systems that are tested and operated continulowly like the Shuttle, 5 TAG, and t , , , are measured in execution time. Note that, as with any methodology for assuring sojkware safety, we can't guarantee safety. Rather, with these criteria, we seek to reduce the risk of deploying the software to itn acceptable level.
Remaining Failures Criterion
On the assumption that the faults associated with failures are removed (this is the case for the Shuttle:,, criterion I specifies t h a t the residual failures and faults mud be reduced to a level where the risk of operating the s o h a r e is acceptable. As a practical matter, we suggest lc=l. That is, the goal would be to reduce the expected remaining failures to less than one before deploying the software. Ifwe predict R(tJ>% we would continue to test for a total time f5h that is predicted to achieve R(t;)<k, on the assumption that we wiu experience more failures and comect more faults so that the remaining failures will be reduced by the quantity R(Q-R(Q. If the developer does not have the resources to satisfy the criterion or is unable to satisfy the criterion through additional testing, the risk of deploying the software prematurely should be assessed (see the next section). We know from Dijkstra's dictum that we can't demonstrate the absence of faults; however we can reduce the risk of failures occurring to an acceptable level, as represented by R. This Scenario is shown in Figure 1 . In case A we predict R(t.&R, and the mission begins at h. In case B we predict R(tJ;?R, and postpone the mission until we test for time f' and predict R(tJ<R In both cases criterion 2) must also be satisfied for the mission to begin.
One way to spec4 Re is by failure severity level (e.g., severity level I for life threatening failures). Another way, which imposes a more demanding safety requirement, is to spec@ that R. represents all severity levels. For example, R(Q4 would mean that R(tJ must be less than one failure, independent of severity level. We use this approach in our examples.
Time to Next Failure Criterion
Criterion 2 specifies that the software must survive for a time greater than the duration of the mission. If we predict TAtJsf, we would continue to test for a total time G'5>t, that is pred&ed to achieve Tp(fZtt)X,,,, on the assumption that we will experience more failures and correct more faults so that the time to next failure w i l l be increased by the quantity TF(Gl')-T&J Again, if it is infeasible for the developer to satisfy the criterion for lack of resources or failure to achieve test objectives, the risk of deploying the sofhvare prematurely should be assessed (see the next section). This_scenario is shown in Figure 2 . In case A we predict T&)>t,,, and the mission begins at &. In case B we predict TAtJst,,, and postpone the mission until we test for time 4'' and predict TF0)ta In both cases criterion I ) must also be satisfied for the mission to begin. If neither criterion is satisfied, we test for a time which is the greater of f' or 4''.
Risk Assessment
The amount of test execution time f can be considered a measure ofthe maturity of the software. This is particularly the case for systems like the Shuttle where the software is subjected to cantinuous and rigorous testing for several years.
Ifwe view 6 as an input to a risk reduction process, and R(tJ and Tp(fZ) as the outputs, we can portray the process as shown in Figure 3 , where R, and t , , , are shown as "levels" of safety that control the process.
Remaining Failures
We can formulate the risk of criterion I as follows:
We plot equation (3) in Figure 4 as a function of 6 for R=l , where positive, zero, andL negative risk correspond to R(&)>&, R(&)=R, and R(t2)<&, respectively, and the uNsAF7E and SAEE regions are above and below the X-axis, respectively. This graph is for the Shuttle operational increment OZD; an operational increment (01) is comprised of modules and configured from a series of builds to meet mission functional requirements. In this example we see that at approximately 4=57 the risk transitions from the UNSAFE region to the SAFE region.
Time to Next Failure
Similarly, we can formulate the risk of criterion 2 as follows:
We plot equation (4) in Figure 5 as a function of 6 for L=8 days (a typical mission duration time for this 01), where positive, zero, and negative risk corresponds to TAG%, TF(t2)=fn, and TAW$,,, respectively, and the UNSXFE and SAEEregions are above and below the X-axis, respectively. This graph is for the Shuttle operational increment OIC. In this example we see that at all values of 6 the risk is in the SAFE region.
Approach to Prediction
In order to support our safety goal and to assess the risk of deploying the software, we make various reliability and quality predictions. In addition, we use these predictions to make tradeoff analysis between reliability and test time (cost). Thus our approach to reliability prediction is the following: 1) Use a software reliability model to predict total failures, remaining failures, and operational quality, 2) Predict the time to next failure (beyond the last observed failure); 3) Predict the test time necessary to achieve required levels of remaining failures (fault) level, operational qualig, and time to nexl failure: and 4) Examine the tradeoff between increases in levels of reliability and quality with increases in testing.
Prediction Equations
The following prediction equations are based on the Because the flight software is run continuously, around the clock, in simulation, test, or flight, "time" refers to continuous execution time and test time refers to execution time that is used for testing.
In these predictions, the parameter Q is the failure rate at the begummg of interval s; the parameter p is the failure rate per fail=, t is the last observed count interval: s is the index of time intervals for selecting the optimal subset of failure data that will result in the best estimates of a and p and the most accurate predictions [SCH93] ; X, is the number of failures observed from 1 through s-1; qt is the number observed from s through t; and Xt=Kl+X,,. Failures are counted against operational increments (01s). Data from four 1 O h , designated OH, OIB, OIC, and OID are used in this analysis.
Maximum Failures
The pmhcted maximum number of failures over the life of the software (t-) is:
Remaining Failures
On the assumption that the faults corresponding to failures are removedfiom the sofhare a f t r the failures occur, the maximum number of remaining failures, predicted at time tis:
5.3 Fraction of Remaining Failures:
Operational Quality
The operational quality of software is defined as:
We recognize that there are many attributes of software quality such as maintainability and useability . Iittributes like these are diflticut to quanw and measure. Om-Q is easy to quantdj and measure: it represents the quality of the sottware during execution, as measured by the absence of failures.
Test Time to Achieve Specified Remaining Failures
The predicted test time required to achieve a specified number of remaining failures, where R(tJ is the specified number of remaining failures at 4, is:
Time to Next Failure
The predicted time for the next Ft failures tcl occur, when the current time is t, is given by:
The terms in T&) have the following definitions: t: currentinterval; X,,: Cumulative number of failures observed in the range s,t; and F, : Given number of failures to occur &er interval t.
We consider equations (5)-(9) and (1 1) to be measures of reliability; equation (1 0) represents the test lime required to achieve stated reliability goals. Although wc consider Q, equation (9), a measure of reliability, we call it Operational Quality, and not Operational Reliabiliv, to avoid possible confusion with the formal definition of reliabili,p: the ability of a system or component to perform its required function under stated conditions for a specitied paiod of time WN]. Ea suallty requirement is stated in tenrts ofpaction of remaining failures, the definition of Q as Operational Quality is consistent with the EEE definition of quality: the degree to which a system, component, or process meets specified requirements [IEEgO]. shown that because the product and process change over the life of the sohare, old failure data (i.e., s=l) are not as representative of the current state of the product and process as the more recent failure data (i.e., e l ) [SCH93] .
Criterion for Optimally Selecting Failure Data

The Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliabiliv
Functions for Software (SMERFS) FAR931 is used for all predictions except 4, which is not implemented in SMERFS.
Mean Square Error Criterion for Remaining Failures
Although we can never know whether additional failures may occur, nevertheless we can form the dflaence between two equations for R(t): (6), which is a function of predicted total failures and the observed failures, and (7), which is a fuuction of test time, and apply the MSE criterion. This yields the following Mean Square Error (MSW criterion for number of remaining failures:
where F(i) is the predicted cumulative failures at time i and y is the cumulative observed failures at time i.
Mean Square Error Criterion for Time to Next Failure(s)
The Mean Square Error (MSb) criterion for time to next failure@), which was derived in [SCH93 1, is given by equation (1 3):
1-1 amount of testing required to achieve high levels of quality.
The terms in MSE, have the following dehitions:
Cumulative number of failures observed in the range s,i; F,: Number of failures observed during j since i; T,: Time since i to observe number of failures Fq during j (i.e., T,=j-i) t:
J: Maximum j d where F,M.
Next interval j>i where FbM;
Upper limit on parameter estimation range; and
Relating Testing to Reliability and Quality
Predicting Test Time and Remaining Failures
We use equation (5) 
Predicting Operational Quality
Equation (9) is a uselid measure of the operational quality of software because it measures the degree to which faults have been removed fiom the software, relative to predicted total failures. We call this type of q d t y operational (i.e., based on executing the software) to distinguish it from static quality (e.g., based on the complexity of the software).
Using given values of p and equations (8) Figure 7 as Quality and Execution Time, respectively for OH. We again observe the asymptotic nature of the testing relationship in the great
Predicting Time to Next Failure
First, we show the actual time to next failure in Figure  8 for OIA on the solid curve that has occurred in the range &=1,18, where one failure occurred at t=4,14, and 18, and two failures occurred at t=8 and 10. All failures were Severity Level 3: "Workaround available; minimal effect on procedures". The way to read the graph is as follows: Ewe take a given failure, Failure 1, for example, it occurs at e4; therefore, at t=l the time to next failure=3 (4-1); at e 2 the time to next failure=2 (4-2); at t== Failure 1 occurs, so the time to next failure=4 (8-4) now refers to Failure 2. Next, using e-on (ll), we predict the time to next failure TAlS) to be 4 (3.87 rounded) on the dashed curve. Based on the foregoing, this prediction indicates we should continue testing ifTF(18)=3.87st, (mission duration).
Making Safety Decisions
In making the decision about how long to test f2, we apply our safety criteria and risk assessment approach. We use Table 1 and annotated on Figure 9 would be obtained. These results show that m*terion 1 is now satisfied (i.e., WE) and operational quality is high. We also see that at this value of f2, further increases in would not result in a sigdcant increase in reliability and safety. Table 2 shows a summq of remaining and total failure predictions compared with actual fd&e data, where available, for OH, OIB, OIC, and OID. Because we do not know the actual remaining and total failures, we assume the remaining failures are "zero" for those 01's (B, C, and D) that were executed for extremely long times (years) with no additid failure reports; correspondingly, for these O h , we assume that total failures equals the total observed failures. 
Summary of Predictions and Validation
Predictions
Conclusions
Sohare reliability models provide one of several tools that software reliability managers of the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics SofMare are using to provide contideme that the sohare meets required safety goals. Other tools are inspe~tions, sohare reviews, testing, change control boards, and perhaps most important --experience and judgement.
We have shown how to apply these models; the approach would seem to be applicable to other safety critical systems. We encourage practitioners to apply these meff i d . 
